Selection Of Steve Jobs Case Study Commerce Essay

Selection Of Steve Jobs Case Study Commerce Essay The purpose of this assignment and the selection of Steve Jobs case study draw in many features of leadership theories and works connected with Jobs Apple or his business activity. His leadership tells again one further thing that sometimes successful leaders may divide into two camps the whole world : some adore the leader and others cannot stand him. This sensation is not so unusual as example of Margaret Thatchers political leadership and many military leaders over the centuries. Apples success made Steve Jobs a successful leader and the main thing is Jobs personal creation is Apple. During his time there were Bill Gates and Michael Dell who were fabulously successful in different parts of the IT business, but Jobs Apple was always the most creative, the quirkiest, maybe even the coolest of the three brands. By this time, many of us already learned, heard, read and watched about Steve Jobs many contributions to the society, his achievements on many accounts. Consumers passions about Steve Jobs and the Apple are rare in the business world. In Soho I was passing by an Apple store not long ago and found flowers and hundreds of post it notes from so many expressing gratitude to Steve Jobs. As his biographer Walter Isaacson and others have pointed out, however, Steve Jobs was far from perfect.   Id like to comment in particular on his leadership and management style.   It is well-known that Steve Jobs could be arrogant, dictatorial, and mean-spirited.   Yet he was a great leader. So, this overturns some management writers claims and thoughts todays business leaders need to be nice, kind, humble (Level 5 leadership), and practice servant leadership? I think the contradiction about leadership can be clarified by two sets of aspects. One we need to recognize the situational leadership. In some circumstances one style could work properly but that might not work in some others at all. Ambiguity or the surprise matter always there while claims being made about the behaviour and the characteristics of the universal leadership. Woking overseas and leading cross functional global teams definitely recognize leadership needs to be adapted culture specific. Mr. Jobs leadership not mentioning his genius activities was a key part in the success of Apple. If he had used another style, might not be able to achieve the glorious success at Apple. The other one is apart from arrogance style of Mr. Jobs he had some great executive leaders qualities visionary, risk taker, emotional stability, openness to experience, and highly focused, committed or persistent, passionate and positive attitude. Not only he dived into his vision, he made sure companys everyone brought into that created for the company a higher purpose which excited really the company employees. His products and passions of course were legendary in Apple. He established trust among company members not as a founder but in marketing and product design. Leadership And Organisational Behaviour issues To understand the attached case studys key aspect module Organisational Behaviour, I have done a detailed research on Apple Inc. policies, leadership strategies etc. Balanced Scorecard Institute defined the balanced scorecard which is a management and planning system used to bring into line business activities to the vision and the organisations strategy, communications (internal external) improvement, and against strategic goals monitor organisational performance. Most organisations, to bring effective changes use the balanced scorecard. But APPLE INC. doesnt implement the scorecard for operating changes but uses for long term performance. It focuses on various categories of measurement in the following order Financial Perspective Shareholder Value Customer Perspective Market share and customer satisfaction Internal Process Perspective Core Competencies The Innovation and Improvement Perspective The three wide-ranging Organisational Behaviour aspects have been taken i.e. Leadership, Motivation, and Change Management to identify whether Apple Inc. is following a good strategy or any possibility of improvement or any requirement of complete change. Especially the focus is more or less orbited around the Apple Inc.s CEO Steve Jobs throughout the report and the way he be able to manage and motivate the Apple Inc.s employees Leadership Through the case study and because of Steve Jobs I deeply researched and found on crisis moment Apple called him and simply Steve Jobs turned the things around and took the organisation at top level, honestly I got charmed by this man. His leadership styles sets for everyone example, he is visionary and transformational leaders role model. For example the price of Apple share 2% fell on Steve Jobs illness rumour in 2008. Because of some power struggles internally, Apple forced Steve to leave his job in 1985 and after that nearly one decade Apple was in serious crisis. In 1996 financial losses was reaching $81600000 and in 1997 it was $1 billion and instead of $70 per share (1991) it became $14 per share. In 1997 March issue Fortune Magazine described Apple as Silicon Valleys paragon of dysfunctional management. (Woods, 1997). Later Apple appointed Steve Jobs as the CEO and everything started changing even Apple is much ahead than rivals HP, Dell, Microsoft etc. and posited or ranked sixth in the list of reputable companies. In spite of his all achievements, Steve always been encircled with arguments. Beside the concern of the products of Apple, he is looked up as a business idol. Transformation leadership consists of charisma, motivation (inspirational), stimulation (intellectual) and consideration (individual). Everybody knows that Steve Jobs had these all qualities except the last one consideration (individual). He had a perfection achieving phenomenal hunger and acted as a one man army to reformed computing system. From his past as well as the past of Apple we can see his greatness. Todays the digital image of the society is enhanced by the Apple i.e. Steve Jobs. During 1985 to 1997, successfully he transformed Pixar into a successful speculation. Only lack was Steve Jobs liked secrecy. Apple builds trust but never talked about their forthcoming products. They always talked about their achieved things and this behaviour effects a lot to the Apple Inc. employees. His arrogant and top-down approach is not going to work according to William C. Taylor (Harvard Business Review, 2009) With an excellent speech ability and superb fascinating influence over the audience and his employees, Steve Jobs is a very powerful charismatic leader. He made his employees enthusiastic by the charismatic power and convinced customers to buy Apples products. Apart from his charismatic power he is also known as devious, rude and corrupt. He did not respect individual, employees scared him, though its perfection quest but still shows his consideration for individual is low to some extent. He made his employees better but not to be easy on them. Survey in 2008 shows that employees were not enough satisfied with their bonus and compensation level but they had towards the products and the policies of the company full passion. Steve Jobs tremendous qualities of charismatic power, Apple outperformed others primarily in the business market. Though charismatic leadership power matched with him but his individual consideration does not go with him. In this respect my doubt goes whether Steve Jobs is a charismatic leader or a personalised leader more. Motivation The purpose and direction of behave is the psychological process which is referred by the Motivation. An organisation will be benefitted if the employees are motivated by effective productivity though its a very complex task as motivation keeps on changing. In 2010, Glassdoor results show clearly that Apples employees are respectful to their boss and are motivated. A few years before and the present Apple if compare, anyone can easily realise that Jobs was outstanding to get his employees commitment properly that proved Apples employees motivation. When excellence expected then employees need not be told anything said by Steve Jobs in 1989, initially needs to coach them. the motivation model of the Maslows hierarchy of needs (1943) describes that the needs can be classified into these stages (including last need being basic need most). SELF ACTUALISATION Doing what best you can do ESTEEM NEEDS Self-respect and respect from others BELONGING Acceptance and being part of something SAFETY NEEDS Physical and Psychological security PHYSIOLOGICAL NEEDS Hunger, Thirst, Rest etc. Esteem , Belonging and Self Actualisation needs are as highlighted is that according to me, these are the underperformances in the Apples motivation level for employees. Apple never put hard gear on the employees motivation as they never knew what company coming up with next. They are restricted to go from one department to another by using electronic badges as terrorists. Jobs kept software and hardware department separate and set in different buildings. Steve Jobs always looking for perfection, a notorious manager, instead of motivate he used his stick. This definitely is not followed the Maslows hierarchy of needs. Steve Jobs was an autocratic as he wanted people to listen to him. Though innovation is part of the involvement of the employees but this theory had a doubt on Apples innovation. Definitely it conflicts with the Self Actualisation Stage of Maslows hierarchy. In 2006, Roderick Kramer wrote for Harvard Business Review, a certain degree of forcefulness might prove to be useful when it comes to handling intractable problems. So, Steve jobs always worked on his own way and delivered fabulous results does not mean that his ways is the right way. Because its not about Steve Jobs, its the question about Apple Inc. So, therefore the way Jobs worked is not the right way. According to an insider Steve was acute with his employees, made them cry but also most of time he was right. His viewpoint was exceptional and he had no asshole rule, he was tyrant in his workplace but if employees not fully pleased then things not going to work same way in future. Change Management The development of an organisation depends on Change Management, a set of behavioural science-based theories, values and strategies. It is not an easy job. W Pasmore in 2010 said that many leaders failed to make operating and critical changes to led the organisation. Apple like many other big companies gained mastery in this matter. Not only Apple Inc. comes up with new and innovative technology but also the implementation of the financial figures of them vastly accepted all over the world. Steve Jobs has many reasons to be successful in change management and out of those understanding and anticipation of customers requirement most. Change Management helps an organisation to take from one level to the next level by treating Employees as Focus Group. Steve doesnt rely on focus groups, instead he is a steady believer that customers themselves dont know their requirement. Without asking them he has a strong understanding ability and can anticipate his customers call. So he treats as focus group his own employees and without any customer intervention makes the decision. By giving such huge importance to the employees, the employees themselves feel a part of the change. Thus he gains the employee loyalty very easily. The products like iPod, iPhone, and iTunes are great examples that prove his expertise in understanding the customer needs. Every individual thinks own way differently and has got own different insights and assertiveness in life. So, therefore, its not possible to get 100% support from all the employees. Rather, to accept and adapt to change, they need to be motivated and inspired enough. Jobs chooses team members by selecting multiplier factor of excellence. He believes that the extraordinary designers, engineers and managers are not only better than the good ones by 10 or 20 % but 10 times better. He feels that outstanding products come from their contributions. Eliminating Fear of Change: Over time, Steves leadership has made the organisations mantra, together with its distribution and channel partners. While iTunes launch, people thought it might change the entire music industry. With the charismatic ability Jobs eliminated the fear of change, and they achieved their 100% contribution and iTunes in the music industry made a revolution. Managing Changes in Distribution Strategy: the whole distribution strategy might be disrupted at time by the innovation and Apple faced the problem on their iPod launching time. They made good relation with big box stores like Wal Mart, Target etc. before introducing them in the consumer electronics industry. For distributing digital music iTunes also built a complete new distribution strategy successfully and thats the way Apple overcome the changing problem in distribution strategy. Review of Literature Most business leaders expect to touch the level Steve Jobss did before he died in October 2011. He is the legendary visionary player one in a century. He is a dynamic and controversial leader and his success totally relied upon his innovation capabilities. During time the legacies left by many other protruding leaders become clear. However, we already by today have tremendous clarity of Jobss leadership. Because of the masterful biography of Walter Isaacson, we know that Jobs pursued former CEO of CNN and managing editor of  Time Isaacson, for five years (the first of many examples of Jobss persistence in the book), and then gave him a free hand (a much rarer occurrence), promising: Its your book. I wont even read it. Certainly Steve Jobs was a wayward and ambitious leader, and his innovation, commercialization and services to the society through Apple Inc. changed the way of life styles of many of us and developed truthfully great ways for computing, publishing, movies, music, and mobile telephony industries. His way or style of leadership is complex, risky, committed and charismatic to convince customers and employees on his aspiration. Though he is greatest business executive of the era but he was critical, tyrant one. All too often he was the antithesis of the servant leader model popularized in the 1990s (the giving, caring organizational mentor who in many ways contrasted with the hero model of a century prior). Not only at Apple Inc. but at NeXT and at Pixar, he seeded powerful culture. He created a place where motivated people make great products. He had fascinating and perplexing leadership. Personally and professionally he fell in and out of love with people easily. Because of his great talent he created extraordinary skilful organisation but he missed many peoples potential contribution. In question of teamwork, he always challenged to do beyond the possible. So, a few strong people cope with this challenge to keep remain the pride but many others usually become frustrated. In a way this is a loss of encouragement and emotional effect as the theme comes up A players and B players. Then there was Jobss habit of distorting reality to fit his purposes, coupled with the impatience, criticism, and brusqueness that often accompanied it. On the one hand, the Jobs version could create a compelling vision of what might be. Witness the strong cultures that he fostered at his companies: Even through the 10 years he was exiled from Apple, the underlying essence of the culture he established somehow stayed alive. On the other hand, Jobss reality distortion could be extremely alienating, and it sapped his credibility, especially when he used it to dismiss a promising idea or an effort as a piece of crap. Applied to the wrong strategy, market, or product, his behaviors could sink a company. In the end, what made Jobs such a successful leader was his much-lauded talent at envisioning and delivering breakthrough products and services. His ability to innovate for his customers in a way few leaders had done before served as a salve to his gruff personal style. Very few top leaders pay as much attention to product and design detail as Jobs did. He always considered simplicity, functionality, and consumer appeal before cost efficiency, sales volume, or even profit. That attention was integral to the strategic and marketing capabilities of his companies. In these respects, Jobs was an entrepreneurial leader in the mode of Walt Disney and Edwin Land, both of whom he admired. Jobs famously said that customers dont know what they want until weve shown them. Indeed, he had a remarkable, but not infallible, ability to develop products that consumers would buy and savor, as well as the confidence, courage, and drive to bring them to life. Part and parcel of this appeal was Jobss remarkably clean sense of design, which Isaacson traces back to his study of Zen Buddhism and, further still, to his adoptive father, a blue-collar mechanic who rebuilt cars in the familys garage for extra income. Much of Jobss genius and Isaacson contends his genius was for imaginative leaps [that] were instinctive, unexpected, and at times magical stemmed from his ability to integrate diverse disciplines, particularly the humanities and science, a sort of synthesis of artistry and engineering. With age and experience, Steve Jobs became a better leader of people. Although Jobs was never one to dwell on his own shortcomings, Isaacson quotes a statement he made during a 2007 conference in which he revealed a somewhat reluctant, even latent sense of an important flaw. Because Woz and I started the company based on doing the whole banana, we werent so good at partnering with people, he said of Apples design philosophy. I think if Apple could have had a little more of that in its DNA, it would have served it extremely well. Jobs would have benefited from more of that in his leadership DNA, too. Who knows if he had had more time, he might have been able to close that gap altogether. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS By looking at the financial results of Apple Incorporated, people might perceive that things are going quite well within the organisation. But the entire analysis above shows that there are a lot of loopholes in Apples functioning which requires a deep thought. Where Steve Jobs is considered as an idol by millions of people, at the same time his attitude questions whether he is a true transformational leader or more of a personalised leader. One might feel that innovative products of Apple are a result of employee motivation and involvement. But that is not the case. By analysing the levels of motivation with the help of Maslows Hierarchy of Needs, it was found that the top three levels of needs go dicey in case of Apple employees. However, there is no denying the fact that Apple has mastered in the concept of change. Whether it is about training the employees for change or it is about managing the changes in distribution strategy, Apple has successfully managed changes both within a s well as outside the organisation. My recommendations to the company, particularly to Steve Jobs, are: No wonder apple has no match in its innovation. But things can further improve provided that employees are given more freedom to express their thoughts. Moreover, if instead of Stick, Jobs can manage with some positive motivation, it can do wonders for the company as far as employee loyalty is concerned. Steve Jobs, undoubtedly, is a fantastic charismatic leader. The analysis in the report clearly shows that the charisma of Steve Jobs has single handed taken the company to such heights. But Apple needs to think beyond Steve Jobs. The company should start focussing more on its future, for which it is really important that the other members of the organisation also start scratching their heads and reduce their dependency on one man. Read more:  http://www.ukessays.com/essays/business/the-terms-of-organisational-behaviour-issues-business-essay.php#ixzz2HK3tupwa Steve Jobs Organizational Behaviour, Leadership theory from Subhendusankar Kar SOME POINTS ON STEVE JOBS LEADERSHIP AND VISION http://www.livescience.com/16442-visionary-science-steve-jobs.html group assignment on steve jobs http://www.scribd.com/doc/41982491/Group-Assignment-Case-Study http://en.oboulo.com/us-management-and-leadership-steve-jobs-63068.html management and leadership of steves INTRODUCTION Apple: One Year After Steve Jobs Death, iPhone Sales Disappoint Wall Street http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2012/02/03/is-apple-truly-agile/ (function() { var scribd = document.createElement("script"); scribd.type = "text/javascript"; scribd.async = true; scribd.src = "https://www.scribd.com/javascripts/embed_code/inject.js"; var s = document.getElementsByTagName("script")[0]; s.parentNode.insertBefore(scribd, s); })() http://assignmentpapers.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/entrepreneur-steve-jobs.html http://hbr.org/2012/04/the-real-leadership-lessons-of-steve-jobs/ar/1 Summing Up We know that there are basically two types of organisational leaders the transactional and the transformational. Transactional leaders are the ones who work with the safety of the status quo. Transformational leaders strive with all their might to change the existing order of things. They are the ones who bring about major, positive change for a group, organisation or society. We have seen that Steve Jobs was able to direct his people and make them do things which they had never done before, but these things were also essential for the realisation of his vision and plans. I leave it your judgment to deduce what style of leadership Jobs followed. It is quite logical to assume that Jobs style of management changed over the years. This is also indicated in the following quote When Jobs was ousted from Apple in 1985, he was often termed as arrogant and bully combined with perfectionist attitude, something that indicates the Authority-Obedience Manager' (Fortune 2009, The Decade of Steve). In 2009, due to medical reasons, Steve delegated his responsibilities to Tim Cook, Apples COO for six months, and everything went on smoothly. Perhaps, he had mentored his executive team successfully to think and decide like him, which indicates that his style had probably moved on to being a Team Manager. Interestingly, Jobs may not be the embodiment of an effective leader in a way, he was far from being a classical text-book example. Nevertheless, his charisma, self-confidence and passion for work overshadow all his flaws, making him one of most successful CEOs of the decade.

Agency conflicts

The genius of public corporations teems from their capacity to allow efficient sharing or spreading of risk among many investors, who appoint a professional manager run the company on the behalf of shareholders. However, the public corporation has a key weakness – namely, the conflicts of Interest between managers and shareholders. The separation of the company ownership and control, which Is especially prevalent where corporate ownership Is highly diffused, gives rise to possible conflicts between shareholders and managers.In theory, shareholders elect the board of directors of the company, which in turn ire's managers to run the company for the Interests of shareholders. Managers are supposed to be agents working for their principals, that Is, shareholders, who are the real owners of the company. In a public company with diffused ownership, the board of directors is entrusted with the vital tasks of monitoring the management and safeguarding the interests of shareholders. Un fortunately, with diffused ownership, few shareholders have strong enough incentive to incur the costs of monitoring management themselves when the benefits from such monitoring accrue to all shareholders alike. The benefits are shared, but not the costs. When company ownership is highly diffused, this â€Å"free-rider† problem discourages shareholder activism. As a result, the interests of managers and shareholders are often allowed to diverge. With an ineffective and unmotivated board of directors, shareholders are basically left without effective recourse to control managerial self-dealings.Recognition of this key weakness of the public corporation can be traced at least as far back as to Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (1 776), which stated: The directors of such Joint-stocks companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be the partners of a private cooperator frequently watch over their own†¦. Negligence and p rofusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.Agency theory in a formal sense originated in the early asses, but the concepts behind it have a long and varied history. Among the influences are property-rights theories, organization economics, contract law, and political philosophy, including the works of Locke and Hobbes. Some noteworthy scholars involved in agency theory's roommate period in the asses included Airmen Lucian, Harold Demesne, S. A. Ross and the famous paper â€Å"Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure. † of Michael Jensen and William Neckline.In an ideal situation the manager (or entrepreneur) and the investors sign a contract that specifies how the manager will use the funds and also how the investment returns will be divided between the manager and the investors. If the two sides can write a complete contract that specifies exactly what the manager will do un der each of all possible future unforeseen events, there will be no room for any inflicts of interest or managerial discretion. Thus, under a complete contract, there will be no agency problem. However, it is practically impossible to foresee all future contingencies and write a complete contract.This means that the manager and the investors will have to set up the control rights to make decisions under those contingencies that are not specifically covered by the contract. Because the outside investors may be neither qualified nor interested in making business decisions, or if there will be too many of investors, the manager often ends up acquiring most of this residual control right. The investors supply funds to the company but are not involved in the company's daily decision making. As a result, many public companies come to have â€Å"strong managers and weak shareholders. The agency problem refers to the possible conflicts of interest between self – interested managers as agents and shareholders of the firm, who are the principals. In the described circumstances the manager will end up with residual control rights to allocate investors' funds, and sometimes the disclosure of investment channels may not be clear and full. So the investors are not longer assured of achieving fair returns on their funds, in other words the agency problem lies in a loss of trust for the manager by the shareholders of the company.In the following paper examples of the agency problem, proposed ways of solving and controlling methods and their analysis will be presented and discussed. Chapter 1 . Prerequisites of the agency problem and different approaches to solving it 1. 1 . How we detect an agency problem Agency theory suggests that the firm can be viewed as a combination of different relationships – some of them well and others can be loosely defined – between resource holders. The primary agency relationship in business is between stockholders and mana gers.The relationships are not necessarily harmonious; indeed, the agency theory is concerned with so-called agency conflicts, or conflicts of interest between agents and principals. This has implications for, among other things, corporate governance and business ethics. When the agency problem occurs sustain an effective agency relationship, those will be discussed a bit later. So what can be signals for managerial self-interested behavior? Sometimes, the manager simply steals investors' funds.Alternatively, the manager may use a more pesticides scheme, setting up an independent company that he owns and diverting to it the main company's cash and assets through transfer pricing. For example, the manager can sell the main company's output to the company he owns at below market prices, or buy the output of the company he owns at above market prices. Some oil companies are known to sell oil to manager-owned trading companies at below market prices and not always bother to collect the bills.Self- interested managers may also waste funds by undertaking unprofitable projects that benefit themselves but not investors. For example, managers may allocate funds the ay to take over other companies and overpay for the targets if it serves their private interests. Needless to say, this type of investment will destroy shareholders' value. What is more, the same managers may take anti-takeover measures for their own company in order to secure their personal Job and perpetuate private benefits.In the same vein, managers may resist any attempts to be replaced even if shareholders' interests will be better served by their resignation. These managerial entrenchment efforts are clear signs of the agency problem. One of the clearest signals for the existence of the agency problem can be management of free cash-flow. High level of free cash-flows are usually presented in companies on a maturity stage of life cycle, with a low level of growth, so those free cash?flows are supposed to be distributed as dividends or should be invested in some projects, both of the actions can probably increase the firm's value.But there are a few important incentives for managers to retain cash flows. First, cash reserves provide corporate managers with a measure of independence from the capital markets, insulating them from external scrutiny and discipline. This will make life easier for managers. Second, growing the size of the company via retention of cash tends to have the effect of raising managerial compensation. As is well known, executive compensation depends as much on the size of the company as on its profitability, if not more.Third, senior executives can boost their social and political power and prestige by increasing the size of their company. Executives presiding over large companies are likely to enjoy greater social prominence and visibility than those running small companies. Also, the company's size itself can be a way of satisfying the executive ego. Consequ ently, managers of those companies either sit n a huge bunch of money, or bound to invest in a lot of not so successful projects or to take over some other firms in attempt to diversify and not to pay dividends or at least too high dividends.In the contrast in high-growth industries, such as biotechnology, financial services, and pharmaceuticals, where companies internally generate funds, which fall short of profitable investment opportunities, managers are less likely to waste funds in unprofitable projects. After all, managers in these industries need to have a â€Å"good reputation†, as they must repeatedly come back to capital markets for funding. Once the managers of a company are known for wasting funds for private benefits, external funding for the company may dry up quickly.The managers in these industries thus have an incentive to serve the interests of outside undertaking their â€Å"good† investment projects. Generally, the heart of the agency problem is the conflicts of interest between managers and the outside investors over the disposition of free cash-flows, so in the following part I would like to present different approaches on how owners of the firm can hedge and maintain managers of the firm to lower the risk of agency problem ND, subsequently, agency costs. 1. 2.Remedies of agency problem Obviously, it is a matter of vital importance for shareholders to control the agency problem; otherwise, they may not be able to get their money back. It is also important for society as a whole to solve the agency problem, since the agency problem leads to waste of scarce resources, hampers capital market functions, and retards economic growth. Several main governance mechanisms exist to manage or completely remove an agency problem: 1. Board of directors 2. Incentive contracts 3. Concentrated ownership 4. Debt 5.Overseas stock listings 6. Market for corporate control (takeovers) In most of the countries, shareholders have the right to elect the board of directors, which is legally charged with representing the interests of shareholders. If the board of directors remains independent of management, it can serve as an effective mechanism for curbing the agency problem. For example, studies showed that the appointment of outside directors is associated with a higher turnover rate of Coos following poor firm performances, thus curbing managerial entrenchment.In the same vein, in a study of corporate governance in the United Kingdom, Daddy and McConnell report that the board of directors is more likely to appoint an outside CEO after an increase in outsiders' representation on the board. But due to the diffused ownership structure of the public company, management often gets to choose board members who are likely to be friendly to management. The structure and legal charge of corporate boards vary greatly across countries.In Germany, for instance, the corporate board is not legally charged with representing the interests of shareholders. Rather, it is charged with looking after the interests of stakeholders (e. G. , workers, creditors, etc. ) in general, not Just hardliners. In Germany, there are two-tier boards consisting of supervisory and management boards. Based on the German extermination system, the law requires that workers be represented on the supervisory board. Likewise, some U. S. Companies have labor union representatives on their boards, although it is not legally mandated.In the United Kingdom, the majority of public companies voluntarily abide by the Code of Best Practice on corporate governance recommended by the Catbird Committee. The code recommends that there should be at least three outside directors and that the board chairman and the CEO should be different individuals in USA there are a lot of examples of CEO and chairman being the same individual, what is in author's opinion, can be one of the most crucial factors of top-managerial frauds).Apart from outside directors, separati on of the chairman and CEO positions can further enhance the independence of the board of directors. In Japan, most welfare of the keiretsu to which the company belongs. As previously discussed, managers capture residual control rights and thus have enormous discretion over how to run the company. But they own relatively little of the equity of the company they manage. To the extent that managers do not own equity shares, they do not have cash flow rights.Although managers run the company at their own discretion, they may not significantly benefit from the profit generated from their efforts and expertise. In the end of sees researches showed that the pay of American executives changes only by about $3 per every $1,000 change of shareholder wealth; executive pay is nearly insensitive to changes in shareholder wealth. This situation implies that managers may not be very interested in the minimization of shareholder wealth. This â€Å"gap† between managerial control rights and cash flow rights may enlarge the agency problem.When professional managers have small equity positions of their own in a company with diffused ownership, they have both power and a motive to engage in self-dealings. Aware of this situation, many companies provide managers with incentive contracts, such as stocks and stock options, in order to reduce this gap and align better the interests of managers with investors'. With the grant of stocks or stock options, managers can be given an incentive to run the company in such a way that enhances shareholder wealth as well as their own.Against this backdrop, incentive contracts for senior executives have become common among public companies in the United States. As will be shown in the second chapter of the paper, however, senior executives can abuse incentive contracts by artificially manipulating accounting numbers, sometimes with the connivance of auditors (for example, Arthur Andersen's involvement's with the Enron debacle), or by alte ring investment policies so that they can reap enormous personal benefits.It is thus important for the board of directors to set up an independent compensation committee that can carefully design incentive contracts for executives and regularly monitor their actions, and these incentives contracts should be composed in accordance to the characteristics of firm's operational activity, as will be demonstrated in the third part of the chapter. An effective way to mitigate an agency problem is to concentrate shareholdings. If one or a few large investors own significant portions of the company, they will have a strong incentive to monitor management.For example, if an investor owns 51 percent of the company, he or she can definitely control the management (he can easily hire or fire managers) and will make sure that shareholders' rights are respected in the conduct of the company's affairs. With concentrated ownership and high stakes, the free-rider problem afflicting small, atomistic s hareholders dissipates. In the United States and the United Kingdom, concentrated ownership of a public company is relatively rare. Elsewhere in the world, however, concentrated ownership is regularly implemented.In Germany, for example, commercial banks, insurance and other companies, even families often own significant blocks of company stock. Similarly, extensive cross-holdings of equities among keiretsu member companies and main banks are commonplace in Japan. Also in France, cross-holdings and â€Å"core† investors are common. In Asia and Latin America, many companies are controlled by founders or their family members. In China, the government is often the controlling ownership has a positive effect on a company's performance and value, examples of Japan and Germany.This suggests that large shareholders indeed play a significant governance role. Of particular interest here is the effect of managerial equity holdings. Previous studies suggest that there can be a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership share and firm value and performance. Specifically, as the managerial ownership share increases, firm value may initially increase, since he interests of managers and outside investors become better aligned (thus reducing agency costs).But if the managerial ownership share exceeds a certain point, firm value may actually start to decline as managers become more entrenched. With larger shareholdings, for example, managers may be able to more effectively resist takeover bids and extract larger private benefits at the expense of outside investors. If the managerial ownership share continues to rise, however, the alignment effect may become dominant again. When managers are large shareholders, they do not want to rob themselves. To summarize, there can be an interim range† of managerial ownership share over which the entrenchment effect is dominant.Studies showed (Merck, Shellfire, and Vishnu) that the â€Å"entrenchment effect† is roughly dominant over the range of managerial ownership between 5 percent and 25 percent, whereas the â€Å"alignment effect† is dominant for the ownership shares less than 5 percent and exceeding 25 percent. A relationship between managerial ownership and firm value is likely to vary across countries. Although managers have discretion over how much of a dividend to pay to shareholders, debt does not allow such managerial discretion.If managers fail to pay interest and principal to creditors, the company can be forced into bankruptcy and its managers may lose their Jobs. Borrowing and the subsequent obligation to make interest payments on time can have a major disciplinary effect on managers, motivating them to curb private perks and wasteful investments and trim bloated organizations. In fact, debt can serve as a substitute for dividends by forcing managers to disgorge free cash flow to outside investors rather than wasting it.For firms with free cash flows, debt can be a s tronger mechanism than stocks for credibly bonding managers to release cash flows to investors. Excessive debt, however, can create its own problem. In turbulent economic conditions, equities can buffer the company against adversity. Managers can pare down or skip dividend payments until the situation improves. With debt, however, managers do not have such flexibility and the company's survival can be threatened. Excessive debt may also induce the risk-averse managers to forgo profitable but risky investment projects, causing an underinvestment problem.For this reason, debt may not be such a desirable governance mechanism for young companies with few cash reserves or tangible assets. In addition, companies can misuse debt to finance corporate empire building. Companies domiciled in countries with weak investor protection, such as Italy, Korea, and Russia, can bond themselves credibly to better investor protection by listing their stocks in countries with strong investor protection, such as the United States and the United Kingdom.In other words, foreign firms with weak governance mechanisms can opt to outsource a superior corporate governance regime available decision to list its stock on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Since the level of shareholder protection afforded by the U. S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the NYSE is much higher than that provided in Italy, the action will be interpreted as signaling the company's commitment to shareholder rights. Then, investors both in Italy and abroad will be more willing to provide capital to the company and value the company shares more.Generally speaking, the beneficial effects from U. S. Listings will be greater for firms from countries with weaker governance mechanisms. Studies confirm the effects of cross-border listings. Specifically, Dodge, Karol, and Stall (2002) report that foreign firms listed in the United States are valued more Han those from the same countries that are not listed in the U nited States. They argue that firms listed in the United States can take better advantage of growth opportunities and that controlling shareholders cannot extract as many private benefits.It is pointed out, however, that foreign firms in mature industries with limited growth opportunities are not very likely to seek U. S. Listings, even though these firms face more serious agency problems than firms with growth opportunities that are more likely to seek U. S. Listings. In other words, firms with more serious problems are less likely to seek the remedies. Suppose a company continually performs poorly and all of its internal governance mechanisms fail to correct the problem. This situation may prompt an outsider (another company or investor) to mount a takeover bid.In a hostile takeover attempt, the bidder typically makes a tender offer to the target shareholders at a price substantially exceeding the prevailing share price. The target shareholders thus have an opportunity to sell the ir shares at a substantial premium. If the bid is successful, the bidder will acquire the control rights of the target and restructure the company. Following a successful takeover, the bidder often replaces the management team, divests some assets or divisions, and trims employment in effort to enhance efficiency.If these efforts are successful, the combined market value of the acquirer and target companies will become higher than the sum of stand-alone values of the two companies, reflecting the synergies created. The market for corporate control, if it exists, can have a disciplinary effect on managers and enhance company efficiency. In the United States and the United Kingdom, hostile takeovers can serve as a rustic governance mechanism of the last resort. Under the potential threat of takeover, managers cannot take their control of the company for granted. In many other countries, however, hostile takeovers are quite rare.This is so partly because of concentrated ownership in th ese countries and partly because of cultural values and political environments disapproving hostile corporate takeovers. But even in these countries, the incidence of corporate takeovers has been gradually increasing. This can be due, in part, to the spreading of equity culture and the opening and deregulation of capital markets. In Germany, for instance, takeovers are carried out through transfer of block holdings. In Japan, as in Germany, inter firm cross-holdings of equities are loosening, creating capital market conditions that are more conducive to takeover activities.To the extent that companies with poor investment opportunities and excess cash initiate takeovers, it is a symptom, rather than a cure, 1. 3. Different approach for different types of companies In the Journal of Financial and Strategic Decisions Robert L. Lippies wrote an article named â€Å"Agency conflicts, managerial compensation and firm variance†, where e described different situations where one type of managerial compensation would be more effective than others as a solution for an agency problem.The recent literature on agency conflicts between managers and shareholders is characterized by studies that test whether the implementation of incentive compensation schemes mitigate the manager-shareholder conflict. While these studies present evidence that incentives do influence managerial decision-making, no dominant class of incentives has been found. This finding is consistent with evidence that suggests firms must compensate according to their particular characteristics.The article of Robert Lippies will consider incentive compensation in relation to the manager's ability to increase the risk of future cash flows. In this context the relationship between compensation, risk taking, and managerial behavior can be evaluated. I would like to introduce some of his findings with short arguments. 1. Managers who receive a large portion of their total compensation in fixed wages will m ake efforts to reduce the variance of future cash flows. 2. Managers who receive a large portion of their total compensation in the form of fixed wages will have interests aligned to those of bondholders.Both wage and bond payoffs are negatively affected by increased dispersion because any values beyond these fixed claims are of no concern. This result implies that the interests of the manager and the bondholder become increasingly aligned as the manager's fixed wage increases. In the case of the pure fixed wage earner or pure bondholder, minimizing variance increases expected utility. Specifically, in this scenario, bondholders and wage earners have interests that are naturally aligned, and that is in direct conflict with the manager's role as an agent for the shareholders.The manager should consider bondholders interests to the extent that they impact the value of the firm but there should not be a direct alignment of interest between the manager and bondholders because this would violate the agency agreement between the shareholders and the manager and ultimately lower the value of common equity. Thus, the incentive compensation scheme must encourage the fulfillment of the principal-agent relationship. 3. Managers who receive a large portion of their total compensation in equity-related securities will make efforts to increase the variance of future cash flows. Managers who receive a large portion of their total compensation in equity-related securities will have interests aligned to those of shareholders. If the manager has significant control over the dispersion of firm values, the compensation scheme should reflect this fact by providing a lower fixed wage and more equity-related rewards. Of course, when the firm compensate its manager by equity-related reward, there is always a threat that the manager will manipulate with a price of shares, those manipulations may harm the real market value of the firm and may even lead to the firm's edge.If, however, t he manager has little control over the dispersion, a different type of remuneration package should be developed which limits the manager's exposure to risk which is beyond his control. 5. Managers of earning high wages will choose to hold larger amounts of the firm's equity-related securities. Assuming that a manager receives a wage, in case of high level of variance the manager should hold enough stock to offset any potential loss in wages.For example, if a firm is subject to large dispersions in value over which the manager has no control, the manager could hedge against a possible loss in wages by holding an mount of stock proportional to his wage claim. This wealth allocation would allow him to offset his potential loss of wages with potential capital gains. 6. Managers of stable firms who have little control over the dispersion of future cash flows and who earn high wages should receive fewer equity-related rewards from the firm.Clearly, if a manager has a little control over a firm's cash-flows, there is no need to connect his reward to the particular indexes of the firm, but as far as the firm is stable and has a lot of cash, it can allow high wage for its manager, what in turn is expected to be fair reward for the manger to prevent him from wrong-doings. 7. Firms which provide their managers with the ability to increase the dispersion of future cash flows should include more equity related rewards in the manager's compensation system. 8.The existence of compensation in the form of stock options lowers the incentive of managers to expropriate wealth from shareholders and increases the incentive to expropriate wealth from bondholders. While prior research has focused on managerial compensation and its motivational qualities; this model suggests that firm-specific characteristics relating o the propensity for firm variance and the degree of control that the manager has over this variance should be the fundamental determinants of managerial reward.In the s econd chapter of my paper various examples of agency problem will be presented, also how different aforementioned solutions were implemented for these examples will be analyzed and discussed. Chapter 2. Practical examples of agency problem's solution 2. 1. Good intentions usually backfire Executive loans. In the asses and early asses, loans by companies to executives with low interest rates and â€Å"forgiveness† often served as a form of compensation. Before ewe loans were banned in 2002, more than 30 percent of the 1500 largest US firms disclosed cash loans to executives in their regulatory filings, sum totaled $4. Billion, with the average loan being about $11 million. Half of these companies, charged no interest on executive loans, and half charged below market rates, and in either case the loans were often â€Å"forgiven†. An estimated $1 billion of the loans extended before 2002 (when they were banned) will eventually be forgiven, either while the executives are still at their companies or when they leave. For executives in companies that went bankrupt during the informational genealogy bubble collapse (when in the most of cases value of Internet-based or oriented companies could have been created by adding e- in front of their names or . Mom after), when investors lost of billions of dollars, this was very useful. According to the Financial Times, executives at the 25 largest US public firms that went bankrupt between January 2001 and August 2001 sold almost $3 billion worth of their companies' stock during that time and two preceding years as the collective shares fell by at least 75 percent, 25 had executives sell a total of â€Å"$23 billion before their stocks plummeted†.Large loans to executives were involved in more than a couple of these companies, one of the most notable being World. World loaned (directly or indirectly) hundreds of millions of dollars?approximately 20 percent of the cash on the firm's balance sheet?to its C EO Bernard Beers to help him pay off margin debt in his personal brokerage account. The loans were both unsecured and about half the normal interest rate a brokerage firm would have charged.World filed for bankruptcy a few months after the last loans were made. As a reaction to these scandals and clear frauds by top-management of huge impasses, the Serbians-Solely Act was passed in mid-2002 to improve financial disclosures from corporations and prevent accounting fraud, but also involved executive compensation. It banned loans by companies to directors and executives, also included the return of executive stock sale profit if overstating earnings will be revealed.Enron's compensation and performance management system was designed to retain and reward its most valuable employees, the system contributed to a dysfunctional corporate culture that became obsessed with short-term earnings to maximize bonuses. Employees constantly tried to start deals, often disregarding the laity of cash flow or profits, in order to get a better rating for their performance review, such actions helped ensure deal-makers and executives received large cash bonuses and stock options. The company was constantly emphasizing its stock price.Management was compensated extensively using stock options. This policy of stock option awards caused management to create expectations of rapid growth in efforts to give the appearance of reported earnings to meet Wall Street's expectations. At budget meetings, target earnings were developed on the basis â€Å"What earnings do you need to keep our stock price up? And that number would be used, even if it was not feasible. At December 31, 2000, Enron had 96 million shares outstanding as stock option plans (approximately 13% of common shares outstanding).Enron's proxy statement stated that, within three years, these awards were expected to be exercised. Using Enron's January 2001 stock price of $83. 13 and the directors' beneficial ownership reported i n the 2001 proxy, the value of director stock ownership was $659 million for the chairman of Enron Kenneth Lay, and $174 million for the CEO Jeffrey Killing. Employees had large expense accounts and many executives were paid moieties twice as much as competitors. In 1998, the top 200 highest-paid employees received $193 million from salaries, bonuses, and stock.Two years later, in 2000 the figure Jumped to $1. 4 billion. As we all know Enron had gone bankrupt on November 30, 2001, before that the price of Enron's share fell to 0,61 $, yet Just in the beginning of the year the CEO promised 2001 will be â€Å"their easiest year†. All in all we can conclude that pay-for-performance policy in combination with excessive stock- options for top-management result in shadowy deals and non-deliberated decisions on all levels of the company.

Food Habits Assignment

Marking Sheet for HSN 101 Food Habits Assignment Criteria| Poor (N)| Fair (P)| Good (C)| Very Good (D)| Excellent (HD)| Mark assigned | | 0-1| 2| 3| 4| 5| | 1. Introduction (total 5 marks)Assignment explanation clear and accurateRelevant background information discussedDescription of aim accurate and appropriate| Additional comments| | 2. Questions to answers about the Food and Diet Questionnaire (Q1-6, total 52 marks)Questions answered appropriately according to instructionsDemonstrates understanding of causes of eating behaviours and their application | 0-25| 26-31| 32-36| 37-41| 42-52| | | Additional comments| | . Questions to answers about the Food Frequency Questionnaire (Q7-11, total 28 marks)Questions answered appropriately according to instructionsJustifies answer appropriately, demonstrating understanding of relevant concepts| 0-13| 14-16| 17-19| 20-22| 23-28| | | Additional comments| | 4. Summary (total 5 marks)Succinct and accurate. | 0-1| 2| 3| 4| 5| | | Additional commen ts| | 5.Referencing, Clarity & Presentation (total 10 marks)Clearly written, with correct English spelling/ grammar & subsections following format of questionUse of 5 or more appropriate referencesVancouver style appropriately used in text and reference list Questionnaires filled out accurately and assignment submitted according to instructions Inclusion & adherence to word count. (i. e. 1500 Â ± 10%, only first 1650 words will be marked) | 0-4| 5| 6| 7| 8-10| | | Additional comments| | | Total of above| |No of days overdue| 0| 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| Final Mark| Penalty (deducted as % of total value of assignment (100 marks), per faculty policy)| Nil | -10%| -15%| -20%| -25%| -30%| | HSN101 Food: Nutrition, Culture, and Innovation Food Habits Assignment Name: Monelle Mondello Student ID: 213157555 Word Count: Introduction This assignment explores the various factors that influence my eating habits. I currently train four days a week, which involves high-intensity strength training specific to body-building and power lifting.I am also currently trying to achieve a body fat percentage of 14%, therefore I must Food and Diet Questionnaire Questions 1 & 2 in the Food and Diet Questionnaire ask about shopping for food and cooking meals. How would your diet change if your answer to these questions changed? Please explain. I do my own food shopping and cooking as I follow a strict diet plan and prefer to be in control of the types of foods I purchase, as well as the cooking methods.If I was no longer responsible for purchasing and cooking my food, I would no longer be able to adhere to the diet plan I choose to follow, as I would not be able to control the individual amounts of food that are used in each meal, and I would most often not agree with the cooking methods chosen, such as the oils chosen for frying. I also place a large importance on the types of produce I purchase, such as organic produce that supports local farmers and is free from pesticides, as well as free ra nge, organic meats for ethical and health reasons.These beliefs always influence my food purchases and I would be forced to compromise them if others were in charge of my food shopping. If the amount of money you spent on food each week doubled, how would this affect the foods you eat? Please explain. I am currently buying the highest quality of food available to me when possible, therefore even if the cost doubled, I would still purchase the same food. However, there are instances where if I am short on money, I will purchase a regular product instead of organic, such as frozen berries, as the cost difference is significant.Therefore I would be sure to always purchase organic, natural, and biodynamic foods. There would be more spent on fresh herbs and products I use to enhance cooking and flavours, such as cocoa powder and certain spices. Overall, the foods eaten would not differ greatly. Question 7 asks you to rate the importance of many food and eating related behaviours. Pick tw o of the behaviours and explain why you answered the way you did. Select behaviours you rate as either ‘very important’ or ‘not important’. You should use references to show whether your belief was correct or not.I do not consider avoiding saturated fat an important aspect Explain reasons why people may choose a vegetarian diet. Question 9 asks you to rate the importance of various factors in deciding your choice of food when shopping. Pick two of the factors that you rated either ‘not important’ or ‘extremely important’. Please explain your answer. I Look at your answers to questions 11-19. Of the answers you have given, please explain which ONE has the most influence on your diet. For example, does your ethnicity determine the type of food you eat, or you living arrangements, or your age etc.?Please explain your answer. Food Frequency Questionnaire How well do you think the food frequency questionnaire captured your usual dietary intake over the past month? Please explain, giving specific food examples that support your explanation. Do you think people who identify with a culture other than your own living in Australia would have similar eating patterns (i. e. chose similar foods) to you? Please explain. How would the types of food you ate change if you had to grow and prepare all the food you eat?Check the foods you eat often in the food frequency questionnaire to use as examples in your answer. How many serves of vegetables do you usually eat each day (question 4 in the FFQ)? How many serves of fruit do you usually eat each day (question 5 in the FFQ)? Comment on your intake compared with the recommendation for your gender and age group. The most recent national survey in Australia found a daily average intake of 3. 4 serves of vegetables and 1. 1 serves of fruit in adults. How do you think this intake could be increased to meet the recommendations? Summary

History 201 - Final Exam (Chapters 10, 12, and 14) Essay

CHAPTERS 10, 12, 14 1. What did Sam Patch represent? In a market economy where skilled â€Å"arts† were being replaced by machine labor, Sam Patch’s acts were a defiant protest against the changing times. 2. What intellectual movement influenced Transcendentalism? The Transcendentalists found inspiration for their philosophy in a variety of diverse sources such as: Vedic thought, various religions, and German idealism. 3. What did Transcendentalists believe in? The transcendentalists desired to ground their religion and philosophy in transcendental principles: principles not based on, or falsifiable by, physical experience, but deriving from the inner spiritual or mental essence of the human. 4. What did the Shakers believe in†¦show more content†¦3. What advantages did railroads have over canals? Railroad rates were usually higher, but railroads were twice as fast as steamboats, offered more direct routes, and could operate year-round. 4. Who invented the telegraph? What rail and steam engines did for transportation, Samuel F. B. Morse’s telegraph did for communication. 5. How did John Marshall impact the growth of the market economy? Under the leadership of Chief justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court became the branch of the federal government most aggressive in protecting the new forms of business central to the growing market economy. 6. What did Marshall rule in McCulloch v. Maryland? In the case of McCulloch v. Maryland, the court upheld the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States. 7. What did Marshall rule in Gibbons v. Ogden? He also encouraged a more freewheeling commerce in Gibbons v. Ogden, which gave Marshall a chance to define the greatest power of the federal government in peacetime, the right to regulate interstate commerce. 8. What did Marshall rule in Dartmouth College v. Woodward? The most celebrated decision Marshall wrote on the contract clause was in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, decided in 1819. The case arose out of the attempt to by New Hampshire to alter the college’s charter of 1796. The court overturned the state law on the grounds that state charters were also contracted and could not be altered by later legislatures. By thisShow MoreRelatedThe Importance Of Sexual Traditions And Values : The Expects Of The Class?3347 Words   |  14 Pagesthose with sexual preferences that differ from the South’s norm faced through history. Students will also learn that the fight for Civil Rights concerns than just race, moreover, it goes far beyond the identity of â€Å"gay† or â€Å"straight†. Students will be evaluated based on classroom discussion and participation, weekly quizzes, a midterm exam, an individual narrative paper, a class group project, and a final exam. Lectures based on the required texts, supplemental readings, and video seminarsRead Morebusiness law chap 92036 Words   |  9 Pagesï » ¿ DE PAUL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF COMMERCE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT BUSINESS LAW - 201 INSTRUCTOR: SAMUEL B. GARBER, M.B.A., J.D. PHONE: 312-362-6788 Course Description: Legal Environment of Business: History of law from the Common Law down to the present Uniform Commercial Code, including ethical considerations and social responsibilities fundamental principles of law pertaining to business and persons, contracts and principal-agent relationship. (Prerequisite: Sophomore Standing)Read MorePHL 612: Philosophy of Law5882 Words   |  24 PagesAlex Wellington Office: Room 428, Jorgenson Hall* Phone: 979-5000 ext. 4057 (E-mail address)**: awelling@ryerson.ca OR alex.wellington@sympatico.ca Office Hours Posted: Wednesdays at 2:10 pm, By Appointment Wednesdays at 3:10 pm and at 4:10 pm, Drop In Time Thursdays at 3:10 pm, By Appointment *Other times may be available by appointment Website: Blackboard course website available through my.ryerson.ca This is an Upper Level Liberal Studies course Course Description: Read MoreStrategy Management18281 Words   |  74 PagesBruce Gin Cover design: MicroArts Pvt Limited (http://microarts.biz/) Interior design: Matt Diamond Typeface: 10/12 Times Roman Compositor: Laserwords Private Limited Printer: R. R. Donnelley Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rothaermel, Frank T. Strategic management : concepts cases / Frank T. Rothaermel. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN-13: 978-0-07-811273-7 (alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-07-811273-7 (alk. paper) 1. Strategic planning. 2. Management. I. Title. HD30.28.R6647 2013 658.4’012--dc23Read MoreHsc General Math Textbook with Answers153542 Words   |  615 Pagessecondary school age. Mathematics–Textbooks. Mathematics–Problems, exercises, etc. 510 ISBN 978-0-521-13834-5 Paperback Reproduction and Communication for educational purposes The Australian Copyright Act 1968 (the Act) allows a maximum of one chapter or 10% of the pages of this publication, whichever is the greater, to be reproduced and/or communicated by any educational institution for its educational purposes provided that the educational institution (or the body that administers it) has givenRead MoreThe Doctrine Of The Trinity9485 Words   |  38 PagesHickman – hickmanl@duq.edu Director: Father Radu Bordeianu, Ph.D. Course Description: At the center of the Christian faith is a mystery. This mystery has everything to do with the identity of God, the nature of Christian community, the salvation history and our understanding of Christology. This is the mystery of the Trinity – how is the Godhead fully three persons, and yet one nature? Theophilus was the first to name the ‘triad’ nature of God in his letter To Autolycus in 170 A.D. TertullianRead MoreProject Mgmt296381 Words   |  1186 PagesCross Reference of Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) Concepts to Text Topics Chapter 1 Modern Project Management Chapter 8 Scheduling resources and cost 1.2 Project defined 1.3 Project management defined 1.4 Projects and programs (.2) 2.1 The project life cycle (.2.3) App. G.1 The project manager App. G.7 Political and social environments F.1 Integration of project management processes [3.1] 6.5.2 Setting a schedule baseline [8.1.4] 6.5.3.1 Setting a resource schedule 6.5.2.4 ResourceRead MoreQuality Improvement328284 Words   |  1314 PagesProduction Editor: Sandra Dumas Senior Designer: Kevin Murphy New Media Editor: Lauren Sapira Editorial Assistant: Mark Owens Production Management Services: Elm Street Publishing Services Composition Services: Aptara, Inc. This book was typeset in 10/12 Times by Aptara, Inc., and printed and bound by R. R. Donnelley (Jefferson City). The cover was printed by R. R. Donnelley (Jefferson City). The paper in this book was manufactured by a mill whose forest management programs include sustained yieldRead MoreFundamentals of Hrm263904 Words   |  1056 PagesLise Johnson Sarah Vernon Amy Scholz Laura Finley Dorothy Sinclair Sandra Dumas Susan McLaughlin Kevin Murphy Laura Ierardi Allison Morris Hilary Newman mb editorial services David Levy  ©Michael Eudenbach/Getty Images, Inc. This book was set in 10/12 ITC Legacy Serif Book by Aptaracorp, Inc. and printed and bound by Courier/Kendallville. The cover was printed by Courier/Kendallville. This book is printed on acid free paper. Copyright  © 2010, 2007, 2005, 2002 John Wiley Sons, Inc. All rights reservedRead More_x000C_Introduction to Statistics and Data Analysis355457 Words   |  1422 Pagespublisher. Thomson Higher Education 10 Davis Drive Belmont, CA 94002-3098 USA For more information about our products, contact us at: Thomson Learning Academic Resource Center 1-800-423-0563 For permission to use material from this text or product, submit a request online at http://www.thomsonrights.com. Any additional questions about permissions can be submitted by e-mail to thomsonrights@thomson.com. Printed in the United States of America 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 11 10 09 08 07 ExamView  ® and ExamView